This paper provides a behavioral analysis of BP, whose capital budgeting decisions in the last decade have resulted in a series of high profile accidents, including the worst environmental disaster in U.S. history. The analysis uses BP as a vehicle to discuss the application of business processes and psychological pitfalls to analyze corporate culture. The paper identifies weaknesses and vulnerabilities in BP's culture, makes comparisons with the corporate financial practices at other firms, and offers suggestions about how BP can engage in debiasing. Notably, the paper also suggests that insufficient knowledge of behavioral decision making resulted in analysts, investors, and regulators attaching insufficient emphasis to the risks in BP's operations. The paper calls for more attention to the psychological aspects of corporate behavior by analysts, regulators, corporate managers, and academics.
Introduction
In this paper, we apply key concepts from behavioral finance to document how psychological biases and framing effects impacted corporate culture and management decisions at energy firm BP. On April 20, 2010, an accident drilling BP's Macondo well in the Gulf of Mexico produced the worst environmental disaster in U.S. history, an event which dominated the daily news during the spring and summer of 2010. In itself, this event makes the study of BP's decision making of interest, prompting the question of whether the April 20 accident was simply an unfavorable chance event or instead the result of biased decision making.
The discussion of BP's decisions provides a vehicle for discussing more general issues about how corporate managers, analysts, investors, regulators, and academics can apply insights from behavioral corporate finance. In the last decade a literature has emerged documenting the impact of psychological traits such as excessive optimism and overconfidence on the decisions of corporate managers: See Shefrin (2001 Shefrin ( , 2006 Shefrin ( , 2008 Shefrin ( , 2010c , Baker, Ruback, and Wurgler (2007) , and Ben-David, Graham, and Harvey (2007) .
The degree to which firms deal with vulnerability to psychological pitfalls varies, and in this regard firms occupy a spectrum from low to high. Using a framework developed in Shefrin (2008) , our discussion locates BP within this spectrum. The framework identifies process loci for vulnerability to psychological pitfalls, and offers a series of examples of firms that occupy different portions of the spectrum. In applying the pitfall-process framework, we conclude that capital budgeting pitfalls were a major factor in the April 20 accident, and offer suggestions about how BP can use behavioral techniques to debias, improve its decisions going forward, and achieve a stronger corporate culture.
Assessing vulnerability to psychological pitfalls is not just an issue for corporate managers. In respect to BP, investors, analysts, regulators, and the media generally missed the warning signals. Consider a contrast between the characterization of BP by investors. We also suggest that academics have a special responsibility to incorporate the behavioral dimension into their research, and to teach future managers how to run organizations that are less susceptible to psychological pitfalls.
A word of caution about the devil being in the details: we describe BP's activities in considerable detail. We do so for at least two reasons. The first reason is to convey, as best as we can, the psychological context in which BP made its choices. Some of the underlying issues are subtle, and not always salient in media coverage. 1 The second reason is that we have been unable to detect very few of these details mentioned in analysts' reports, leading us to believe that analysts and investors were either unaware or chose to ignore critical issues associated with BP's risk management practices. The description we provide of decisions and events involving BP underscores what analysts failed to highlight.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 focuses on events involving BP at Texas City and Alaska, which were documented in Shefrin (2008) . Section 2 introduces the pitfall-process behavioral framework and briefly applies it to analyze BP's decisions at Texas City and Alaska. Section 3 describes the events surrounding the explosion of Deepwater Horizon, with a behavioral analysis of BP's standards for risk management. Section 4 deals with the judgments of legislators, analysts, investors, and regulators. Section 5 focuses on steps firms in general and BP in particular can take to improve their cultures to mitigate biases using cognitive repairs. The paper ends with concluding remarks.
Major Problems in Texas and Alaska: History

Shefrin (2008) described problematic issues which arose at BP's operations in Texas and
Alaska. In this section, we describe conditions and events at those operations 2 which led him to conclude that the firm's culture left its management prone to excessive cost cutting, and to taking excessive risks in respect to the environment, worker safety, national security, and the company's profitability.
Texas City
In 2005, the failure of an emergency warning system at a BP refinery in Texas City,
Texas caused an explosion that killed fifteen people. The Texas City facility was the second largest refinery in the U.S., but it had been built in 1934, and was poorly maintained. 3 The investigation that followed the 2005 accident, conducted by a panel of independent experts led by former U.S. secretary of state James Baker, found significant process safety issues not only at the Texas City, but also in the other five BP U.S.
refineries. 4 In respect to the Texas City accident, the investigating panel found that the explosion occurred when a tower was being filled with liquid hydrocarbons, with nobody noticing that it was being overfilled. The panel noted that workers were discouraged from talking with each other about potential safety issues, and that several workers had been on 12-hour shifts for more than a month (Lyall, 2010) .
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In evaluating conditions at BP's Texas City facility, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) found more than 300 safety violations, 6 and BP agreed to pay $21 million, the largest fine in OSHA history at the time (Lyall, 2010) . In subsequent years, a series of investigations by inspectors from OSHA found more than 700 safety 3 Two months before the accident, a consulting firm hired to examine conditions at the refinery stated: "We have never seen a site where the notion 'I could die today' was so real" (Rowell, 2010) . 4 In 2002, California officials discovered that BP falsified inspections of fuel tanks at a refinery in the Los Angeles area. They also found that more than 80 percent of the facilities didn't meet the requirements needed to properly maintain storage tanks. BP settled a civil lawsuit brought by the South Coast Air Quality Management District for more than $100 million (Lustgarten, 2010) . 5 Jeanne Pascal, a former EPA attorney who investigated the Texas City explosion, referring to BP, once affirmed: "They are a recurring environmental criminal and they do not follow U.S. health safety and environmental policy". He also added that none of the other big oil companies had an environmental record of violations like the one held by BP (Lustgarten, 2010) . 6 Even if BP owns only six of the 150 refineries in the U.S., 97 percent of the most dangerous violations found by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) were on BP facilities, as reported by the Center for Public Integrity (Morris and Pell, 2010).
violations. In 2009, OSHA proposed to sanction BP with a record fine of $87 million for failing to make safety upgrades at that Texas City refinery. 7 The greatest part of the fine was due to the company failing to respect the previous settlement in full.
Alaska
In March 2006, corrosion caused a leak in BP's Alaskan oil pipeline, resulting in a 267,000-gallon spill, which was the largest ever on Alaska's North Slope. The spill forced BP to shut down half of its output from its Prudhoe Bay operations. An investigative panel subsequently attributed the incident to the firm's poor maintenance practices.
Pipelines build up sediment through time that can eventually corrode the pipes, causing leaks and spills. Oil companies check pipelines using a technique called "pigging" that involves the injection of a cylindrical droid (the "pig") into the line. Even though BP pledged to improve its safety and maintenance programs, there were complaints by employees claiming that the company was letting equipment and critical safety systems languish at Prudhoe Bay.
As a response, the company hired a panel of independent experts to examine the allegations. In their October 2001 report, the experts found systemic problems in BP's maintenance and inspection programs. According to the report, it seems that BP was trying to sustain profits in the aging drilling field, even though production was declining.
To achieve this goal, the only way seemed to be to cut costs, with resulting maintenance backlogs. 8 Notably, the panel's report states that there was "a disconnect between GPB 7 On August 10, 2010, BP agreed to pay $ 50 million of as part of this fine (that eventually was reduced to $ 80 million). BP, however, did not plead guilty. 8 The company had not checked pressure valves, emergency safety shutoff valves, automatic emergency shutdown mechanisms, and gas and fire detectors essential to preventing explosions. These key equipments for emergency shutdown were similar to those that could have prevented the fire and the subsequent explosion on the Deepwater Horizon rig in the Gulf of Mexico (Lustgarten, 2010) .
(Great Prudhoe Bay) management's stated commitment to safety and the perception of that commitment" (Lustgarten, 2010) .
The panel experts claimed that solving these problems was necessary to ensure mechanical integrity and operational efficiency in the long run. They warned the management of the company that those issues could have a potential immediate safety impact or pose an environment threat. Without a systemic effort to address them, single actions could only provide temporary relief, and not be a solution in the long run. Alaska state regulators underscored the experts' findings claiming that BP failed to properly maintain its pipelines.
During 2002, the Alaskan Department of Environmental Conservation had a dispute with BP, and to resolve it, the department asked the oil company to use intelligent pigs 9 to probe its pipelines for leaks, along with a list of other tasks, and to pay a fine of $150,000.
BP responded that it had no evidence to suggest that its pipelines had anything more than minimal sediment buildup, thus asserting there was no need to use intelligent pigs. 10 Five days after receiving this communication, the department withdrew its requirement that BP pig its lines.
In the following two years, Alaska pressured BP comply with state laws and check its pipelines. At the same time, the company received from workers several warning regarding the danger of failing to use intelligent pigs.
Eventually, BP asked another team of outside investigators to check the warnings raised by local workers. The resulting 2004 inquiry found that pipeline corrosion and the age of 9 Intelligent pigs are droids loaded with sensors used for maintenance tests in the oil industry. A cheaper and more convenient to use alternative is using external devices such as ultrasound that however are not as effective as intelligent pigs. 10 The use of pigs is standard in the oil industry. For example, the company that operates and maintains Trans Alaska Pipeline System, Alyeska Pipeline Service, checks its pipelines with intelligent pigs every three years, and it also uses cleaning pigs at least twice a month (Shefrin, 2008) .
the field endangered operations at Prudhoe Bay. It highlighted health, safety and environment concerns raised by employees who accused BP of allowing "pencil whipping" (falsifying inspection data), and of pressuring workers to skip key diagnostics to cut costs. BP management was cutting maintenance costs with a "run to failure" strategy, meaning that aging equipment was used as long as possible.
BP eventually ran an intelligent pig through its lines in August 2006, only after the March spill, four years after the department asked it to do so, and fourteen years after the last probe, in 1992. The severe pipeline corrosion and leak caused BP to shut down half of its output from Prudhoe Bay.
BP's problems in Alaska continued. In September 2008, a section of a high pressure gas line on the Slope blew apart. A 28-foot-long section of steel flew nearly 1,000 feet through the air before landing on the Alaskan tundra. Had the release caught a spark, the explosion could have been very significant. In 2009, three more accidents occurred on the same system of pipelines and gas compressor stations, including a near explosion that had the potential to destroy the entire facility. See Lustgarten (2010) . On May 25, 2010 a power failure led to a leak that overwhelmed a storage tank, resulting in the spillage of 200,000 gallons of oil. See Lyall (2010).
Identifying Behavioral Phenomena in Events at Texas City and Alaska
A first step to approaching behavioral issues within organizations is to focus on four specific psychological pitfalls and four specific business processes. For sake of brevity, we refer to this construct as a 4x4 pitfall-process framework.
11 Shefrin (2008) applied this framework to analyze the events involving BP at Texas City and Alaska. In this section, we summarize that discussion in order to set the stage for the analysis of BP's decisions in connection with drilling the Macondo well.
Pitfalls
In the 4x4 framework, the four pitfalls are: excessive optimism, overconfidence, confirmation bias, and aversion to a sure loss.
1. Excessive optimism leads people to look at the world through rose-colored glasses, overweighting the probabilities of favorable events and underweighting the probabilities of unfavorable events.
2. Overconfidence comes in two versions, overconfidence about knowledge and overconfidence about ability. People who are overconfident about their knowledge know less than they think they know, for example about the risks they face. People who are overconfident about their abilities think they are more skilled than they actually are.
3. People who exhibit confirmation bias overweight evidence that confirms their views and underweight evidence that disconfirms their views.
4. Aversion to a sure loss leads people act as if they are risk seeking because they cannot accept a sure loss. In this respect, they choose risk hoping to beat the odds.
Processes
The four processes are respectively: standards, planning, incentives, and information sharing. These four processes serve as loci for behavioral pitfalls. Although all organizations engage in these processes in some form or fashion, the key issue is the degree to which they do so in an effective and integrative manner. 
Application to BP's Decisions and Judgments
In the 4x4 framework, there are 16 possible combinations of pitfalls and processes. In respect to BP's decisions at Texas City and Alaska, we suggest the following in respect to four of these combinations:
1. Excessive optimism caused BP's managers to refrain from establishing clear, measurable standards for sediment buildup in its Alaska pipeline.
2.
Overconfidence led BP's managers to limit information sharing about liquid hydrocarbon levels at its Texas City facility. 4. Aversion to a sure loss associated with lower production levels in BP's Alaska drilling field led the firm's managers to plan for excessive cuts in maintenance expenditures.
12 Steve Arendt, a safety specialist who assisted the panel appointed by BP to investigate the company's refineries after Texas City explosion, referring to BP's management, affirmed: "They were very arrogant and proud and in denial. It is possible they were fooled by their success" (Rowell, 2010) .
It seems that these statements are, if not obvious, then highly plausible. Therefore, we elaborate no further, but consider how the 4x4 framework can help explain the decisions involving Deepwater Horizon and the resulting explosion and oil spill.
Decisions Drilling Macondo
In this section we focus on how decisions BP made about digging its Macondo well generated the worst environmental disaster in U.S. history. In doing so, we interweave a narrative of the events with behavioral commentary.
On September 2, 2009, BP announced the discovery of a very large field in the Gulf of Mexico called Tiber, estimated to hold more than 500 million barrels of recoverable oil.
That day BP's shares rose by 4.62 percent, indicating the importance investors attached to the announcement. Given declining production in its established fields, such as at Prudhoe Bay, BP's managers may well have concluded that deepwater drilling would drive the firm's future growth. Drilling the smaller Macondo prospect was at the forefront of this strategy. Although Macondo was almost 900 feet deeper than Tiber, it was 13,000 feet below the sea bed, in contrast to 31,000 feet for the larger field (Crooks, 2010) .
BP engaged the drilling firm Transocean to drill Macondo in preparation for production. They too emphasized the importance of standards, along with practices, and procedures.
In their presentations, they contrasted the well designs at Shell with the one used to drill
Macondo. As we now argue, their comments collectively suggest that BP's standards and planning strongly reflected excessive optimism and overconfidence, consistent with the excessive cost cutting behavior associated with the problems that occurred at Texas City and Alaska.
To begin the argument, consider Figure The objective of the drilling activity is to construct a production well with a series of "pipes" to carry oil and gas from its cavity deep below the ocean to the surface of the ocean, with minimal leakage, in order to be collected. Because the oil and gas are trapped at great pressure below the ocean floor, it is critical that the borehole be appropriately lined with steel casing and cement to prevent leakage. through which the drill bit descends into the sea bed below. In case of an emergency, the blowout preventer is supposed to shear the drill bit in such a way that the BOP blades remain closed, thereby preventing oil and gas from rising towards the ocean surface. In addition to the blowout preventer, BP planned to install two cement plugs to serve as barriers for oil and gas escaping from the portion of the well below the ocean floor. One plug was to be positioned in the borehole at the bottom of the well, just above the oil and gas deposit. The second plug was to be placed just below the ocean floor.
The features just described are common to the well design used by BP and the designs used by other firms such as Shell. However, Shell routinely includes a series of additional barriers in the borehole between the bottom of the well and the ocean floor, to serve as backups in case of leakages in the borehole at intermediate points below the ocean floor.
For Shell, the blowout preventer is redundant, what they call a "control" as opposed to a "barrier." For BP, the blowout preventer was intended to serve as a barrier. And in that role, it failed.
The numbered text in Figure 1 traces the sequence which led to the explosion at the ocean surface. In April 2010, BP was on the verge of completing the drilling stage at Macondo.
It had put a cement plug in place at the bottom of the well, and was about to put a second cement plug in place just below the ocean floor, along with a "lockdown sleeve." Before it could complete this task, there was a leak of oil and gas in the well below the ocean floor. Escaping gas rose through the riser pipe to the ocean surface and ignited, creating an explosion and fire. Personnel on Deepwater Horizon attempted to activate the blowout preventer (BOP), with the intent of preventing the oil and gas from rising above the BOP.
However, the BOP did not function properly, and so oil and gas continued to pour from the well.
Among the most important pieces of safety equipment that BP was criticized for not having in place in Alaska, were gas and fire detection sensors and the emergency shutoff valves that they are supposed to trigger. Similar sensors and the shutoff systems that would have been connected to them were not operating in the engine room of the Deepwater Horizon rig that exploded in the Gulf of Mexico. Backstop mechanism that should have prevented the engines from running wild apparently failed. So did the air intake valves that were supposed to close if gas enters the engine room. The engine room was not equipped with a gas alarm system that could have shut off the power.
The design used by Shell is more expensive, but less risky, than the design BP chose to drill Macondo. Given its risk management practices in Alaska and at Texas City, and the attendant results, we conclude that excessive optimism and overconfidence in BP's planning and choice of standards were major factors in the explosion of Deepwater
Horizon. Reinforcing this contention are the following conclusions from Congress' investigation of the incident:
1. BP chose a risky option in installing the casing the day before the accident.
2. BP did not use enough centralizers to keep the casing in the borehole as it was lowered into the well. 3. BP and its contractors did not run an acoustic test to check that the cement attaching the casing to the rock walls of the borehole had formed a seal to prevent gas from escaping.
4. BP did not pump enough drilling fluid through the well to detect and remove pockets of gas before cementing the well.
5. BP did not properly secure the top of the well with a lockdown sleeve to keep it sealed tightly, so that oil and gas were able to leak out and rise to the rig at the surface.
Pitfalls and Information Sharing on the Day of the Explosion
Before the second cement plug and lockdown sleeve could be put in place, the well needed to be tested to ensure that the cement and steel locked together, thereby preventing any gas from leaking and causing a fire or explosion. The well could then be abandoned temporarily until BP was ready to begin production.
Normally, such a test would involve the removal of approximately 300 feet of a thick drilling fluid called mud below the blowout preventer, which would then be replaced with seawater. This is because mud is used to prevent gas leaks into the well. Therefore, a test 13 Centralizers are pieces of metal that maintain a casing centered in the hole. When installing the casing string, BP used approximately six centralizers when its sub-contractor Halliburton had suggested 21. If not enough are used, the casing might get squeezed too hard against one side of the well bore. Then when the cement job is complete, the end result is uneven, and there might be portions where there is almost no cement.
is typically conducted to ensure that the well is fully sealed, before removing too much of the mud.
In terms Fanning is quoted as saying: "It was BP's well, they were paying for it. BP gave the marching orders."
Groupthink is a form of collective confirmation bias, and reflects inadequate airing of the pros and cons of competing alternatives, often because the group leader discourages devil's advocacy. It is in this sense that groupthink operated on Deepwater Horizon the day of the explosion. However, as we now argue, as the day progressed confirmation bias was particularly pronounced.
For the next few hours, Transocean workers removed mud from the well, and by 5 p.m.
had commenced the pressure test. It was at this stage that confirmation bias loomed large.
The test results were unusual, and Transocean workers struggled to interpret the readings. to the next project, and the pressure exerted by dealing with the project being late and over budget. Interestingly, in his 30 years of experience on rigs, Vidrine had never seen a case of U-tubing; he had only heard about it. Our sense is that confirmation bias and aversion to a sure loss exerted strong influences. An alternative view is that the explosion was simply a tail event, and that our sense reflects hindsight bias.
In the two hours between Vidrine's message to Houston and the first explosion, unfavorable signals continued to be generated. For example, electronic data reviewed by investigators after the explosion showed that the net flow of fluid from the well was negative, meaning more fluid was exiting the well than was being pumped in. Perhaps, 15 Rep. Henry Waxman said the oil company told the Energy and Commerce subcommittee on oversight privately that the well failed the key pressure test. "Yet it appears the companies did not suspend operations, and now 11 workers are dead and the Gulf faces an environmental catastrophe," Waxman said, asking why work wasn't stopped on the well.
the Transocean crew missed the signals because they had become distracted by other tasks. Or they might have seen the signs, but not viewed them as abnormal.
According to Shell engineers Leimkuhler and Hollowell, the April 20 test would have been a point of high risk in the process, as the mud restraining any escaping gas and oil would have been removed, thereby providing a potential escape channel for that gas to make its way to the ocean surface.
Again, the base rate for Macondo was that it was a difficult well. The well design featured fewer barriers than the design used by competitors Shell and Exxon. The project was behind schedule and over budget, and a modified procedure for a critical test was introduced at the last minute. Was April 20 a time for focusing resources on the tasks at hand, or was it a time to introduce distractions?
BP chose the distracting route. Ronald Sepulvado, the BP manager in charge of the rig was on shore that day for a training program with his phone switched off, Transocean's Harrell, and his second-in-command Randy Ezell, had spent much of that day hosting executives visiting the rig. The visiting executives included including BP's Pat O'Bryan, who had recently been appointed vice president for drilling in the Gulf of Mexico.
Ironically, the agenda included commending the crew for its safety record and to discuss coming maintenance. Also ironically, O'Bryan was an expert in detecting gas leaks in oil wells.
Excessive Optimism and Overconfidence in BP's Crisis Management
We now come to issues that received the most media attention, and with which people are most familiar. After the explosion of Deepwater Horizon, and the failure of the BOP to prevent oil and gas from escaping from the well, there were serious concerns about the environmental impact on the Gulf, especially on the fishing industry and on recreational activities on U.S. beaches. BP's CEO at the time was Tony Hayward. However, the ratio of the spill to the volume of water in the Gulf is misleading as a measure of the damage caused by the spill. BP eventually estimated that the cost of the spill would be $32 billion and set aside $20 billion in reserves. 16 As oil from Macondo washed up on beaches in Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama and Florida, the spill severely impacted the Gulf Coast economy, and threatened its ecology. Federal and state authorities shut down Gulf fisheries. The Federal government instituted a temporary federal ban on deepwater drilling, thereby idling oil workers. Scientists warned that the Gulf wetlands, which are pivotal in its ecology, were at high risk. In addition, as of September, the amount of spilled oil which has not disappeared remains controversial. A team of researchers from the University of Georgia announced that they had identified a two-inch thick oily layer coating the ocean floor at locations stretching up to 80 miles from the Macondo wellhead, which they believe stems from the BP spill.
Throughout much of the cleanup effort, statements from BP executives reflected excessive optimism and overconfidence. For example, on June 8, BP Chief Operating
Officer Doug Suttles stated that the spill "should be down to a relative trickle by Monday or Tuesday" (Sappenfield, 2010) . In a major effort at the end of May, called "Top Kill," BP sought to plug ("kill") the well from the ocean floor (the "top"). "Before 'top kill' started, the company's executives were genuinely optimistic that it might work."
Hayward said that "top kill" had a 60 -70 percent chance of stopping the oil flow. Top kill failed (Crooks, 2010) .
Excessive optimism and overconfidence were persistent features of BP's public announcements. In the first weeks following the Deepwater Horizon explosion, BP estimated a spill of 1,000 barrels of oil a day. Soon after, they raised their forecast to 5,000 barrels daily. In the second week of June, independent experts suggested that a more precise estimate could be between 35,000 and 60,000 barrels a day.
The excessive optimism of BP's management was also related to the real dimension of what they were facing in the Gulf. They deeply underestimated the size of the oil spill flow rate from the well, and then did not try to adjust it.
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As for overconfidence, in seeking permits to drill in the Gulf, BP claimed it could handle a leak of 250,000 barrels of oil per day. "Those claims were later shown to be ludicrously overconfident" (Crooks, 2010) . 17 In doing so, they displayed "anchoring bias" that leads people to remain mentally anchored to a specific reference point, and not adjust sufficiently. Anchoring is related to conservatism and it induces to poor planning, and thus to insufficient response in case of problems. BP's executives remained anchored to their initial estimates, and didn't want to adjust them subsequently, underestimating the real size of the problem.
Missed Signals
A 4x4 analysis of BP's corporate culture, conducted after events at Texas City and Alaska, but before the explosion on Deepwater Horizon, points to excessive cost cutting, weak risk management practices, and high risk exposure. These traits were manifest in Hayward appears to have believed that safety at BP was trending upward, and that the explosion on Deepwater Horizon was effectively an outlier. In a memorandum to employees just after the explosion, Hayward stated: "This accident has been a terrible exception to that trend and we must learn the lessons from it. But at the same time, it does not invalidate all the hard work you have put in to improve our safety standards around the world. Safety is our first priority. It will remain so" (Lustgarten, 2010) .
Although safety might have been first priority at BP in Hayward's mind, the record shows that as of June 2010, BP had 760 OSHA fines for "egregious, wilful" safety violations. By way of contrast, Exxon Mobil had just one violation (Sverjensky, 2010) .
Anecdotally, Lustgarten (2010) describes an incident in 2008, a time during Hayward's tenure as CEO, in which BP failed to deliver final "as built" design drawings to crews operating deepwater rigs in the Gulf. These drawings are considered an essential safety component because they not only provide the basis for establishing that equipment operates properly, but also serve as instruction manuals in case of emergencies.
Lustgarten point outs that an independent contractor met with resistance when he raised the issue of the drawings with BP engineers and management, who he suggests were seeking ways to reduce costs by several million dollars. The contractor subsequently lost his contract.
In May, Congressional hearings into the explosion of Deepwater Horizon led Bart
Stupak, chair of the oversight and investigation committee to point out that BP's corporate culture was characterized by excessive cost cutting and excessive risk taking. Accounts of the sort just described led to an interesting observation by David Michaels, assistant secretary of labor for occupational safety and health. He stated: "The way safety is measured is generally around worker injuries and days away from work, and that measure of safety is irrelevant when you are looking at the likelihood that a facility like an oil refinery could explode. This is comparable to saying that an airline is safe because the pilots and mechanics haven't been injured."
Analysts: Availability Bias and Confirmation Bias
Analyst coverage of BP is illuminating. We examined reports between October 2006 and September 2010 to assess analysts' perceptions and recommendations, with special emphasis on 130 reports from 27 brokerage firms during the period August, 4, 2009 to September, 17, 2010. See Table 1 for a summary of reports issued between April 20 and September 10, 2010. After reviewing the reports, we move onto our general conclusion that analysts lacked a framework for assessing risk management practices and corporate culture at BP, leading them to issue excessively optimistic recommendations reflecting availability bias and confirmation bias.
One of the strongest results in the literature on financial analysts is that analysts' recommendations tend to be biased upward. This feature has been often been explained by potential conflict of interests faced by analysts. In this regard, analysts working for financial intermediaries with actual or potential business relationships with the companies 19 As a matter of fact, in February 2009, Hayward told reporters: "The mantra in BP today is 'Every dollar counts'" (Crooks, 2010) . In 2009, BP implemented a $4bn cost reduction. While production increased by only 4%, the unit production costs reduced by 12% (BP, 2009, p. 84 Evidence shows that stocks positively recommended by affiliated analysts tend to perform worst than the ones recommended by independent analysts (Michaely and Womack, 1999; Barber, Lehavy and Trueman, 2007) . As a general matter, independent analysts' recommendations display less upwared bias (Malmendier and Shanthikumar, 2007) .
Apart from potential conflict of interests, we suggest that behavioral biases played a major role in analysts' recommendations on BP's stock. Effectively, Figure 2 indicates that the degree of herding in analysts' recommendations for BP stock increased after the April 20 explosion. Kim and Zapatero (2009) propose a theory suggesting that the star-system leads analysts' recommendations to display less herding in lower volatility stocks than in higher volatility stocks. Their theory also leads to the prediction that an increase in the volatility of a particular stock will cause an increase in herding for that stock. In this regard, Fodor and Stowe (2010) 21 See figure 4 in Fodor and Stowe (2010) . 22 Two notable exceptions are represented by the reports by ING dated June, 22 and August, 23, with target prices maintained at £7.12. However, as the analyst (Jason Kenney) highlights, these target prices should be considered on a 1-3 years horizon. Therefore, we do not include them in our analysis, since they cannot be compared with other target prices with a 12-months horizon.
Notice that the trend for premium is upward sloping, similar to the one for recommendations. We note that after April 20 no premium is negative, and that premia seem to be more dispersed, reflecting the greater uncertainty analysts faced after the accident.
To gain more insight into analysts' thinking, both before and after the explosion of BP's progress in strategy development and cost cutting with Shell, we believe it is much more advanced in both areas. Consequently, in our view BP has a significant competitive advantage over its adversary" (Youngson, 2010, p. 1) .
Notably, Youngson's report identifies key issues: safety, cost cutting, and profitability.
However, in our view his analysis failed to assess these correctly. Youngson's report on BP is fairly typical of analysts' assessments. We examined 33
reports that were issued after April 20, 10 of which by UBS. In the report of April 28, UBS's analysts clearly underestimated the effects of the accident, stating "[…] we think these costs are more likely to be in the hundreds of millions rather than billions and hence, ultimately, unlikely to be material to the long-term investment case." They were recommending purchasing BP stock, setting a target price of £7.25. Between April 20 and May 10, BP lost 17 percent of its value, corresponding to $32bn of market capitalization.
In UBS analysts' view the decline corresponded to "a substantially exaggerated reaction although less so in the context of weak markets."
On May, 25, UBS analysts eventually reduced the target price to £6.30, and to £5.80 on June, 1, but always maintained the buy recommendation. Interestingly, in the latter report, they state "Our forecasts, which look at recurring net income and exclude specials (we assume the costs of the spill are 'special') […]". On June 7, the analysts calculate in a very detailed way the potential costs of the spill. However, they keep the buy recommendation, and the previous target price. In the reports of June 11 and 17 they stated that the market reaction was mainly driven by political factors. Interestingly, they maintained the buy recommendation and did not change their target price, both of which remained more or less stable through the UBS report of September 9, 2010.
By and large, analysts' reports prior to the explosion of Deepwater Horizon emphasized costs and risks in the Gulf of Mexico which were associated with weather and price swings, rather than oil spills and related operational accidents. These reports strongly to replace Tony Hayward as CEO, we think BP is in serious need of an extreme makeover to change its culture and the way it conducts business. In order to achieve that, many key managers may have to be replaced."
MSCI's ESG Research group revised the manner in which it analyzes risk. It now focuses on risks associated with regulatory risk in respect to health and safety, especially in offshore operations. Notably, its framework for analyzing health and safety involves examining management systems, budgets, track records for oil spills and fatality/injury rates. In September, the research group noted that BP had the highest offshore regulatory risk among its peers and was ranked at the bottom for risk management systems in this dimension.
Nevertheless, some analysts appear to have been unconvinced about the centrality of BP's risk management, especially in connection with well design. In a report dated September 9, 2010, UBS analyst Jon Rigby and associate analyst Caroline Hickson made the following comment, based on the release of a BP report released on September 1: "Report offers some rebuttal to critics -well design not to blame… BP says "multiple" parties and causes involved in Macondo… BP's internal (although independent) report into the Macondo incident (the Bly report) indicates there was no one clear cause or culprit of the disaster… The committee stressed in a conference call that the well design was "robust" and not unusual for the area, and also defended the use of only six centralizers and the limited circulation of the drilling mud. These decisions had all been listed as possible causes of the blowout by the US congress…" Rigby appears to have based his assessment on BP's report without adjusting for potential self-interest bias on the part of BP, and assessments of competitors such as Shell and Exxon. One possible explanation for doing so is the issue we described earlier, whereby analysts write reports that are excessively favorable in order to curry favor with the companies they follow, in the hope the management of these companies will engage the firms for which they work. This motivation has been suggested in the popular financial press. See Pressman (2010) , who discusses this possibility. offshore oil drilling, announced that he was dividing MMS into three divisions. He affirmed: "We inherited here what was a legacy of an agency that essentially was rubberstamping whatever it was that the oil and gas industry wanted" (CNN Wire Staff, 2010).
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The new name of the agency "Bureau of Ocean Energy, Management, Regulation and Enforcement" has been chosen to stress the different duties of the distinct divisions.
Debiasing Using Cognitive Repairs
As we stressed in the previous section, one of the most important lessons for analysts from the BP-Macondo incident involves the need to assess how a firm's culture impacts its risk profile, and by implication its prospects and value. In our view, analysts need to develop systematic procedures for assessing the extent to which firms are working to improve their cultures, particularly their susceptibility to psychological pitfalls. On the other side of the coin, one of the most important lessons for firms' management teams is the importance of mitigating their vulnerability to psychological pitfalls, thereby improving their firms' cultures.
In this section we apply the literature on debiasing and cognitive repairs to suggest ways that BP in particular, and other firms in general, can improve corporate culture. The 4x4 pitfalls-process framework described in section 2 provides the structure for our discussion, together with the cognitive repair approach described in Heath, Larrick, and Klayman (1998) . Shefrin (2008) argues that the starting point for instituting organizational debiasing is the recognition that psychologically induced mistakes are akin to addictive diseases. What behaviorally-induced mistakes and addictive behaviors share in common is habituation.
We know something about how to treat addictive diseases. We know that twelve-step programs are group programs that have truly helped many people combat their addictions. Indeed, "step one" of twelve is to acknowledge the problem. In the case of psychologically induced mistakes this means acknowledging susceptibility to phenomena such as confirmation bias, excessive optimism, overconfidence, and aversion to a sure loss. Shefrin suggests that successful debiasing often requires group interaction. Heath et al. make a similar point, stating that "many successful repairs will be social because individuals may not recognize the need to repair themselves" (p. 28).
The extent to which BP's management has taken "step one" remains an open question.
During appearances before both the U.S. Congress (in May) and the British Parliament's energy panel (in September), Hayward was aggressively questioned about his promise some years ago to focus like a laser on safety. In response, he stated that BP's record was "better than the industry average." In this regard, he went on to say that the blowout preventer on the rig "was fully compliant with the regulatory regime and it should have functioned." When asked about a BP employee having described Macondo as a "nightmare well," Hayward termed the description "unfortunate" and noted that the well Taken at face value, our view is that Hayward's statements reflect confirmation bias. As the MSCI materials discussed in section 4 indicate, BP's offshore risk management practices lie at the bottom of their peer group. This is the case, even though during 2009, BP's history of spills and fatality/injury rates was better than others. As we discussed in section 3, BP's well design treated the blowout preventer as a barrier, whereas alternative well designs such as those in use at Shell, treat the blowout preventer as a control. In this respect, we believe that Halliburton has a legitimate point. As for the characterization of the "nightmare well" designation as "unfortunate," consider remarks from one of the mechanics who worked on Deepwater Horizon: "I've seen a lot of gas coming up from muds on different wells, and the highest I've ever seen in my 11 years was 1,500 units.
And this well gave us 3,000. I've never been on a well with that high of gas coming out of the mud. That was kind of letting me know this well was something to be reckoned with."
As the title of this paper indicates, under Tony Hayward's leadership, BP failed to debias.
BP announced that Tony Hayward is to be replaced by his colleague Bob Dudley as CEO. Will Dudley be able to succeed where Hayward failed?
In the context of the 4x4 pitfalls-process framework, consider some cognitive repair techniques aimed at mitigating bias at BP. In the discussion below, we focus on processes first, identify pitfalls, and then suggest repairs. Notably, the discussion stresses the importance of interaction across processes. Therefore, many BP staff came to be heavily invested in the firm through employee share ownership plans. Shefrin (2006) argues that incentives alone do not align the interests of managers and shareholders. In particular, biases and framing effects associated with the other three processes standards and planning can undercut theoretically appropriate compensation plans. As was discussed in section 3.2, aversion to a sure loss is particularly dangerous, with its associations to sunk cost fallacy, escalation of commitment, and risk seeking decisions. See March and Shapira (1992) . Shefrin (2006) describes several techniques for addressing aversion to a sure loss. One of these was coined "fire yourself" by Intel's former CEO Andrew Grove. He suggested that the best way for an executive to deal with the reluctance to terminate losing projects is to pretend to fire him or herself, and act as he or she would were they to be the replacement, without the associated psychological pitfalls. Technically speaking, Heath et al.
suggest that improving incentives is separate from instituting cognitive repairs.
Nevertheless, firms like BP need to address how people are rewarded (or penalized) for resisting cost cutting measures they deem to be value destructive.
Rewards and penalties can be nonpecuniary (praise and blame) as well as financial.
4. Information sharing: This is a broad category, which involves (1) hypothesis generation, (2) information collection, and (3) the drawing of conclusions.
An example of a hypothesis in respect to the April 20 test results on Deepwater
Horizon is that readings were caused by "U-tubing." Heath et al. suggest that individuals often generate too few hypotheses, as may have been the case with the U-tubing hypothesis. They suggest two particular cognitive repairs for this tendency, known as "the Five Whys" and "single-case bore questions," both of which are procedures for asking questions designed to address overly narrow search.
In respect to information collection, Heath et al. discuss methods for dealing with availability bias and rare events. GM did not, instead choosing to maintain production rates. We hypothesize that because of poor processes and culture, confirmation bias and aversion to a sure loss both contributed to GM's value destructive decision. On the other hand, Ford had instituted sound processes, and managed to mitigate these pitfalls.
When Tony Hayward became CEO, BP would have done well to have done something similar to Alan Mulally's debiasing efforts; but he did not. Analysts, investors, and regulators would have done well to monitor BP's efforts at debiasing using a pitfallsprocess framework; but they did not. We suggest that Bob Dudley needs to initiate sensible debiasing procedures at BP; we hope he does so. We suggest that analysts, investors, and regulators need to monitor BP's efforts at debiasing in a systematic fashion; we hope they do so.
Conclusion: Lessons For Academics and Everyone Else
The explosion of Deepwater Horizon is an event offering many lessons.
The first lesson is that psychologically induced mistakes can be very expensive. The current estimate attached to BP's liability for the explosion of Deepwater Horizon is $40
billion. Indeed, as we complete this article, the U.S. government has joined 80 other litigants in suing BP for damages.
The second lesson is that BP is not an isolated case. Shefrin (2010c) argues that psychological pitfalls at financial firms were also the root cause of the global financial crisis that erupted in 2008. Indeed, a side-by-side comparison of this paper with Shefrin (2010c) reveals that the same psychological issues plaguing these financial firms also plagued BP. In this regard, see also Walter (2010) .
The third lesson is that BP's corporate culture supported if not encouraged its high risk profile. In this regard, panel appointed by the U.S. government to investigate the explosion of Deepwater Horizon concludes that the main issue was a "failure of management" especially at BP with inadequate policies for managing risk and sharing information. As a result, decisions intended to save time and increase efficiency created a higher risk exposure.
The fourth lesson, which follows immediately from the third, is that the weaknesses in BP's risk management culture were already apparent in 2007, after the accidents which occurred at BP's facilities in Texas and Alaska. Moreover, events after 2008 only served to reinforce this assessment. Yet, analysts, investors, and regulators all missed the signals, and underestimated operational risk at BP.
The fifth lesson is that there is a strong need for a better conceptual framework to judge the quality of corporate culture and risk management before disaster strikes. In this regard, we contend that a useful way of characterizing a firm's culture is in terms of a process-pitfall framework. Corporate financial judgments pertaining to decisions about capital budgeting, capital structure, valuation, agency contracts, and mergers and acquisition fit naturally into this framework.
The process-pitfall framework provides a convenient way both to diagnose biases in a firm's culture, and to use cognitive repairs to address those biases. At the same time, debiasing is difficult. Nevertheless, what BP must do to heal its problematic corporate culture is an important issue for the future. This statement applies well beyond BP to other firms with problematic corporate cultures, to the analysts covering those firms, and to regulators and supervisory authorities overseeing these firms.
The sixth and final lesson is that academics need to ramp up the emphasis they attach to the behavioral dimension of corporate finance, both in the classroom and in their research. Admittedly, behavioral corporate finance is still relatively novel, even within academia, although behavioral concepts are slowly making their way into traditional textbooks and into research agendas. However, the rate of diffusion is slow. We suggest that ignorance about behavioral corporate finance allowed publicly available information about BP's high risk operations to go unnoticed by analysts, investors, and regulators.
We already teach elements of the four processes in traditional corporate finance courses.
When we teach our students the principles of valuation and financial ratios, we are teaching them about standards. When we teach them pro forma forecasting techniques, we are teaching them about planning. When we teach them about agency theory, we are teaching them about incentives. And when we teach them about financial reporting and the preparation of incremental cash flow forecasts in respect to capital budgeting, we are teaching them about sharing information.
What traditional corporate finance courses tend to ignore is how to integrate the four processes together in a way that recognizes and mitigates managers' vulnerability to psychological pitfalls. One conclusion we draw from BP's recent history, and for that matter the choices made by financial firms, is that there should be a sense of urgency about integrating behavioral concepts into traditional courses in corporate finance.
Otherwise, we remain as vulnerable as ever to future environmental disasters, financial crises, and severe economic downturns. 
